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Abstract: The influence of U.S. Supreme Court majority opinions depends 
critically on how these opinions are received and treated by lower courts, which 
decide the vast majority of legal disputes. We argue that the retirement of Justices 
on the Supreme Court serves as a simple heuristic device for lower court judges 
in deciding how much deference to show to Supreme Court precedent. Using a 
unique dataset of the treatment of all Supreme Court majority opinions in the 
courts of appeals from 1953 to 2012, we find that negative treatments of Supreme 
Court opinions increase, and positive treatments decrease, as the Justices who 
supported a decision retire from the Court. Importantly, this effect exists over and 
above the impact of retirements on the ideological makeup of the Supreme Court. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Opinions by the U.S. Supreme Court fundamentally shape the legal landscape and thus 
have a significant effect on social, economic, and political outcomes. As scholars have long 
recognized, much of this impact is realized indirectly through the manner in which high court 
decisions (which are relatively few in number) guide and constrain the decisions of other courts 
in the judicial hierarchy (e.g., Cameron Segal, and Songer 2000). Put differently, the influence 
and importance of any given Supreme Court decision is largely a function of its treatment in 
lower courts. Do lower court judges faithfully follow the opinion, ignore it, or perhaps cast doubt 
on it? Given that the manner in which Supreme Court decisions fare in the lower courts is so 
central, it is not surprising that scholars have taken great interest in understanding what drives 
lower court treatments of Supreme Court precedents. A rich literature, much of it developed over 
the last fifteen years, has illuminated this question. Thus, we now have a good understanding of 
how the characteristics of Supreme Court opinions – including the number of concurrences, as 
well as the size and breadth of the majority coalition – shape subsequent lower court treatment 
(Benesh and Reddick 2002; Benjamin and Desmarais 2012; Black and Spriggs 2008; Corley 
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2009). Similarly, scholars have made significant progress in uncovering how dynamic changes in 
the legal environment, including the age of Supreme Court opinions, and ideological shifts 
between the enacting and subsequent Supreme Courts, affect how lower courts treat precedents 
(e.g., Westerland et al. 2010, Hansford and Spriggs 2006). 
In this paper, we focus on a factor that has escaped systematic analysis: The impact of 
personnel change on the Supreme Court over and above the impact of such change on the 
ideological composition of the Court. Specifically, we argue that – separate from the impact of 
judicial turnover on the general ideological position of the Court – the retirement of Supreme 
Court Justices who joined a majority opinion significantly impacts the staying power of the 
decisions they supported: As departures reduce the number of Justices on the Court who 
explicitly signed on to an opinion, lower court judges become significantly less likely to follow 
the opinion, and more likely to openly cast doubt on it. We argue that this effect results from the 
fact that judges on lower courts confront a complex task in applying a large number of 
potentially relevant precedents to the cases before them. As they do so, one key concern is to 
avoid censure by the current Supreme Court. In navigating this problem, lower court judges have 
strong incentives to look for simple heuristics that can help them to identify decisions that are 
more likely to have the support of the current Court (and should therefore be treated positively) 
and those less likely to enjoy such support (and can therefore be narrowly interpreted or ignored 
with less peril). While there are numerous such markers (many of which we control for in the 
empirical analysis below), the retirement of Justices who joined a decision constitutes a 
particularly prominent one that is easy to spot. A dwindling number of Justices who explicitly 
signed on to an opinion readily suggests that the opinion may enjoy less support on the current 
Court. 
In focusing on this effect of judicial retirements, we highlight an aspect of change in the 
Court’s membership that has received scant attention. Most analyses of turnover on the Court are 
concerned with the way in which such changes shift the Court’s ideology (e.g., Ruckman 1993, 
Shipan and Shannon 2003), and what the impact on future Supreme Court decisions is likely to 
be (e.g. Baum 1992, Segal 1985).
1
 Our findings suggest that the effects of turnover on the 
                                                 
1
 Legal scholars and social scientists have made considerable progress in understanding the appointment process and 
exploring how ideological shifts on the Supreme Court affect future Supreme Court decisions. One important 
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Supreme Court go well beyond how the Court decides future cases. Retirements also shape the 
manner in which appeals courts implement existing precedents. Because these courts resolve the 
vast bulk of cases, this implies that the impact of judicial turnover on our legal system is 
potentially far greater than has traditionally been recognized. Justices may think of themselves as 
creating precedents that will long outlive them, but their opinions may instead diminish in 
importance as the Justices who supported them leave the Court. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Part II explains why departures of 
Supreme Court Justices are likely to affect how appeals courts treat past Supreme Court 
decisions. Part III turns to a unique dataset that traces the treatment of all Supreme Court 
majority opinions by courts of appeals on a yearly basis from 1953 to 2012. These data allow us 
to investigate whether appeals court judges respond systematically to the retirement of Supreme 
Court Justices in their treatment of Supreme Court opinions. In Part IV we find strong evidence 
that, controlling for a wide variety of factors known to affect the treatment of Supreme Court 
precedent (including the general ideological shift of the Supreme Court), the retirement of 
Justices who supported an opinion significantly shapes the manner in which these opinions are 
treated subsequently: Opinions experience a significant decrease in influence as fewer and fewer 
of the Justices who originally joined an opinion remain on the contemporary Supreme Court. In 
Part V we conclude by discussing the ramifications of our findings for our understanding of 
Supreme Court precedents and the Supreme Court as a continuing body. 
 
II. SUPREME COURT RETIREMENTS AND THE TREATMENT OF OPINIONS 
In the American legal system, lower courts play a critical role – indeed, the vast majority 
of legal disputes are resolved in the lower courts, and never reach the Supreme Court. Lower 
federal courts handle hundreds of thousands of cases each year, fewer than 100 of which are 
reviewed by the Supreme Court (Administrative Office of the United States Courts 2013). Of 
course, these lower courts are embedded in the judicial hierarchy, and are supposed to adjudicate 
disputes as directed by the relevant precedents, particularly those issued by the Supreme Court. 
To ensure that they do so, and in order to resolve potential conflicts among lower courts, lower 
court decisions are subject to review and potential reversal by the Supreme Court. 
                                                                                                                                                             
not affect the Court’s median (Carrubba et al. 2012). 
 4 
Given the prominent role of precedent in this institutional arrangement, a key challenge 
for lower court judges is to survey the existing stock of precedent to assess how the case before 
them fits into this stock – that is, to determine how the case should be decided in light of the 
applicable precedents. Significantly, this is a complex, challenging task. Typically, there are 
many potentially relevant precedents. And often, there are tensions, if not conflicts, between 
them. In writing an opinion, a lower court judge must therefore decide how to navigate this 
thicket – which opinions to acknowledge as directly relevant, which to present as inapplicable, 
and which to ignore. Naturally, a number of factors are likely to be influential in this process, 
including the jurisprudential and ideological inclinations of the judges.  
As a matter of legal doctrine, one factor that lower court judges are not supposed to 
consider are their perceptions of the current Supreme Court’s views of a precedent. This implies 
that changes in membership should have no bearing on the precedential value of a majority 
opinion. Indeed, a central element of precedent for continuing bodies like the Supreme Court is 
that a past decision remains authoritative even if the specific Justices who created the precedent 
leave the Court. The Supreme Court has stated forcefully that lower courts should not reject 
applicable Supreme Court decisions based on their assessment of a potential change in the 
Supreme Court’s direction. For example, Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Hohn v. United 
States (524 U.S. 236) minces no words: “Our decisions remain binding precedent until we see fit 
to reconsider them” (253).2  
Notwithstanding such pronouncements, however, lower court judges who prefer to avoid 
review and reversal of their decisions (Epstein and Knight 2013, Posner 1993) must consider 
how the current Supreme Court (which, after all, is the body that may review the judge’s 
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noted that one of its opinions was inconsistent with an earlier opinion, but stated flatly: “We do not suggest that 
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opinion) views the potentially applicable precedents. That is, lower court judges seeking to make 
their decisions less vulnerable on appeal face strong incentives to pay attention to the preferences 
of the contemporary Supreme Court as they decide which precedents to rely on to justify their 
decisions (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000, Kastellec 2007, Miceli and Cosgel 1994). If judges 
perceive that support on the Supreme Court for a particular decision may have weakened, two 
potential effects follow. First, circuit judges who disagree with an opinion may feel less 
constrained in expressing their disagreement or, less aggressively, in finding ways to avoid 
following the precedent without explicitly criticizing it. Second, even appeals court judges who 
have no qualms about a precedent may anticipate how the contemporary Court views the 
precedent. If they believe that the current Court is likely to be critical of a given precedent, 
appeals court judges may conclude that the safer course (in terms of avoiding their own reversal) 
is not to explicitly follow that precedent. Put differently, the anticipation that the Supreme Court 
may look upon the precedent with less sympathy may encourage circuit judges to engage in an 
explicit critique or, more modestly, to refrain from following the precedent fully (Dorf 1995, 
Gruhl 1981, Klein 2002).
3
 
A number of factors are likely to lead appeals court judges to suspect that support for a 
decision on the contemporary Supreme Court has weakened, and to adjust their own treatment of 
an opinion in response. Most obviously, circuit judges may react to explicit negative treatments 
of an opinion by the Supreme Court itself (Hansford and Spriggs 2006). Similarly, ideological 
change between the Supreme Court majority that issued a precedent and the current Supreme 
Court suggests that the current Court may take a more critical view of a precedent. It is precisely 
for this reason that scholars have argued that ideological shifts between the enacting and 
contemporary Supreme Court will lead lower courts to treat opinions less favorably, and a 
number of studies provide strong evidence for such an effect (e.g., Gruhl 1981, Hansford and 
Spriggs 2006, Klein 2002, Westerland et al. 2010). Given that the retirement of Supreme Court 
Justices and their replacement with new Justices affects the ideological composition of the Court, 
retirements are therefore (indirectly) relevant for how lower courts treat precedents. 
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 In addition to this positive literature, there is also a longstanding normative debate among legal academics about 
whether appeals courts should predict how the contemporary Supreme Court will respond to one of its 
precedents.  Some reject the Supreme Court’s position that lower courts should not do so, and others offer 
support for the Supreme Court’s position (Dorf 1995, Caminker 1994, Posner 1990, Bhagwat 2000, Bradford 
1990). 
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The central argument of this paper is that such retirement-induced ideological change is 
not the only manner in which retirements matter for how lower courts treat precedent. We argue 
that in addition to this indirect effect, retirements also have a direct negative effect on how lower 
courts treat opinions: Lower court judges do not merely focus on ideological change (What is the 
balance of conservative and liberal Justices?). They also take note of the fact that the particular 
Justices who joined a decision retire. There are two (related) reasons why we expect judicial 
retirements have this effect. First, judicial retirements are correlated with, but separate from, 
general ideological shifts on the Court. For one, ideological shifts can occur even in the absence 
of change in Court membership as the views of Justices evolve (this is, obviously, a major 
impetus behind dynamic measures of Supreme Court ideology, such as the Martin-Quinn (2002) 
scores). More importantly, ideological shifts that are measured along a traditional liberal-
conservative dimension do not capture differences in views that are orthogonal to ideology, and 
can exist even among Justices of a similar ideological persuasion. How Justices view cases is a 
complex phenomenon, affected by ideology, interpretive commitments, life experiences, and 
other (perhaps idiosyncratic) factors (Posner 2008). The manner in which Justices view opinions 
is bound up – at least to some extent – in factors that are tied to their specific experiences and 
temperament. One particularly important factor in this context is that Justices may feel more 
personally attached to opinions they joined than to opinions they did not join. As a result, a new 
set of Justices may take a different view of cases previously decided, even if they share the 
general ideological predispositions of their predecessors. 
This reasoning is reinforced by the fact that in addition to plausibly affecting current 
support for a precedent, turnover on the Supreme Court is easy to spot – an important factor 
given the complexity of the task confronting lower court judges. The retirement of Justices who 
were part of an opinion’s majority acts as a simple heuristic for lower court judges looking for 
evidence that support on the Supreme Court for a particular precedent may have weakened. 
Moreover, this signal becomes stronger as fewer and fewer of the Justices who joined an opinion 
remain on the Court. Consider a lower court judge confronting a precedent for which all the 
Justices from the original majority coalition remain on the Court. In this setting, it is natural for a 
lower court judge to believe that faithful adherence to the precedent may help to insulate her 
decision against review, and that failure to do so risks antagonizing a majority of the Supreme 
Court. In contrast, as more and more of the Justices in the original majority leave the Court and 
are replaced by new Justices, the situation changes. An increasing number of the Justices on the 
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current Supreme Court have not explicitly signed on to the precedent, and the new Justices may 
see the precedent differently.
4
 All else equal, the lower court judge may feel under less pressure 
to explicitly follow the opinion, and may even feel safe in casting doubt on or limiting it. This 
argument leads to the following expectation: 
 
Hypothesis (“Retirement Effect on Lower Court Treatments”): Ceteris 
paribus, lower court judges are less likely to follow a Supreme Court precedent as 
more of the Justices who signed on to the opinion retire from the Court. Similarly, 
lower court judges are more likely to treat an opinion negatively as more of the 
Justices who signed on to the opinion retire from the Court. 
 
III. DATA AND MEASURES 
To test this hypothesis, we require data on how lower courts interact with relevant 
Supreme Court precedents. Since judges on the courts of appeals occupy the level below the 
Supreme Court, and are directly open to review and reversal by the Supreme Court, we focus our 
analysis on them.
5
 To measure the subsequent treatment of Supreme Court majority opinions in 
the courts of appeals, we rely on Shepard’s Citations, an approach that has become standard in 
the literature (e.g., see Benjamin and Desmarais 2012, Corley 2009, Hansford and Spriggs 2006, 
Westerland et al. 2010). Shepard’s is a widely used, commercial legal research company that 
employs attorneys who examine every published state and federal court opinion, and engage in a 
content analysis of every citation in those opinions. Citations that have a substantive treatment of 
an opinion (i.e., discuss it rather than just mentioning it) are classified into the following main 
categories: Overruled, Criticized, Questioned, Limited, Distinguished, Explained, Harmonized, 
or Followed. Shepard’s characterizes Overruled, Criticized, Questioned, Limited, and 
Distinguished as negative treatments. Of these, the first four are viewed as “strongly negative,” 
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 Put simply, the clearest indication of a Justice’s support for a given majority opinion is her joining of it.  A Justice 
who arrives after the opinion is decided cannot give that indication. Note in this regard that in only four cases in 
its history has the Supreme Court overruled one of its cases without a change in membership (Gerhardt 2005: 
952). 
5
 Of course, there are also district courts below the courts of appeals. But district court judges’ opinions are appealed 
to circuit courts (each of which has its own circuit jurisprudence to which stare decisis applies within the 
circuit).  As a result, for district judges, the immediate reviewer is the circuit court, and review by the Supreme 
Court is a more distant concern.  We therefore focus on circuit judges, for whom the only reviewer is the 
Supreme Court. 
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while Distinguished is classified as a mildly negative treatment. Followed – the most common 
treatment – is characterized as a positive treatment.6 Finally, Explained and Harmonized are 
neutral. Spriggs and Hansford (2000) investigate the reliability of Shepard’s by independently 
coding a stratified sample of Supreme Court cases, and find high levels of agreement between 
their coding and Shepard’s. 
Because our argument leads to the expectation that circuit court judges will become less 
likely to follow a precedent, and more likely to cast doubt on it, as more Justices who joined a 
majority opinion retire from the Supreme Court, we focus on strongly negative treatments and on 
Followed. The key dependent variable for our analysis is the count of the number of strongly 
negative and Followed treatments of a given Supreme Court opinion in a particular year. To 
construct our data, we begin with all orally argued cases in which the Supreme Court issued a 
signed majority opinion in the 1953-2012 terms, as reported by the U.S. Supreme Court 
Database (Spaeth et al. 2013).
7
 We then use Shepard’s to generate an annual count of the number 
of strongly negative treatments and Followed treatments for each of these Supreme Court 
opinions in courts of appeals opinions issued between 1953 and the end of 2012.
8
 In other words, 
the unit of observation in the dataset is the “opinion-year,” organized by Supreme Court opinion 
(beginning with the year in which the opinion was issued), a structure that makes sense given our 
interest in how opinions are treated over time. Finally, we combine these data with information 
on the retirement dates of the Justices who constituted the majority in each case, allowing us to 
construct the measures discussed in more detail below. The full dataset comprises 5,813 majority 
opinions and 188,424 opinion-years. 
As we noted above, a strongly negative treatment of a Supreme Court opinion is a risky 
move for a circuit judge. Instead of simply citing or ignoring an earlier case, the lower court 
criticizes, questions, or limits a Supreme Court opinion and thereby casts doubt on it. In so 
doing, the circuit court draws attention to itself and risks rebuke. Not surprisingly, such 
treatments are generally rare. As the aggregate data displayed in Table 1 make clear, roughly 
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 In addition to Followed, Shepard’s also identifies a treatment called Paralleled that is characterized as positive. 
However, this treatment is exceedingly rare – so rare, in fact, that in the courts of appeals data we employ below 
there is not a single instance of a court of appeals treatment that is classified as Paralleled. 
7
 These are those opinions coded as “decisionType=1” in the Supreme Court Database. 
8
 Only the Supreme Court can overrule its own cases, so lower courts’ negative reactions cannot include an 
overruling. Our data encompass the available strongly negative treatments of a Supreme Court opinion by a 
lower court – Criticized, Questioned, and Limited. 
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83% of opinions are never criticized, questioned, or limited in this explicit fashion, and only 2% 
of opinions receive 4 or more strongly negative treatments. By contrast, following a precedent 
that is on point is the expected and obvious way for circuit courts to engage with Supreme Court 
opinions. As this reasoning suggests, Followed is a far more common substantive treatment. 
Note, however, that even for Followed, more than 50% of opinions receive seven or fewer such 
treatments. In order to evaluate changes in treatments over time, we must further break down the 
data into yearly treatments of Supreme Court opinions. As Table 2 shows, once we do so, 
opinions are not strongly criticized in the vast number of years. Followed treatments are more 
common, but even there, most opinions are not positively treated on an annual basis.
9
 
 
Table 1 about here 
Table 2 about here 
 
A. Explanatory Variables 
Our argument implies that circuit court judges use the retirement of Supreme Court 
Justices as a simple heuristic suggesting that support for a decision may have weakened. As a 
result, as more Justices from the original majority coalition retire, the willingness of circuit 
judges to faithfully follow the precedent decreases, and their willingness to openly criticize it 
increases. Importantly, we expect this effect while controlling for more general ideological 
change on the Supreme Court, both because general ideological change is unlikely to capture 
idiosyncratic differences among Justices and because the retirement of Justices who signed on to 
an opinion is easier for circuit judges to spot than ideological change. To capture this retirement 
effect, we employ a variable that indicates the number of Justices from the original majority 
coalition that remain on the current Supreme Court during a particular year.  For example, for a 
7-2 decision, this variable takes the value 7 as long as all Justices from the majority coalition 
remain on the Court, drops to 6 as the first Justice retires, and so on. The expectation expressed 
in our hypothesis is that as the number of Justices who signed on to an opinion and who remain 
on the Supreme Court declines, opinions will be treated in a strongly negative fashion more 
often, and will be followed less often. 
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 The fact that a considerable number of opinion-years feature no strongly negative or Followed treatments raises 
potential methodological challenges that we address below. 
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As outlined above, we believe that this retirement effect is separate from the impact of 
general ideological change on the Supreme Court, which is (of course) itself partly a function of 
judicial retirements. Put differently, we want to clearly distinguish the impact of judicial 
retirements from the impact of general ideological change. To do so, we control for the absolute 
shift in the location of the median Justice on the Supreme Court that issued the cited opinion and 
the current Supreme Court, as measured by the Martin-Quinn (2002) scores, the most widely-
used, dynamic estimate of the Justices’ preferences. We expect that as this distance increases, 
circuit courts will more often treat a Supreme Court opinion in a strongly negative manner. 
Conversely, we expect that the number of Followed treatments will decrease. Indeed, previous 
work has found evidence consistent with this expectation. Benjamin and Desmarais (2012) show 
that the aggregate number of negative treatments increases with the average distance between 
Supreme Court medians, and Spriggs and Hansford (2001) have demonstrated that the Supreme 
Court is more likely to overrule a precedent the greater the ideological distance between the 
decision-median and the contemporary median (see also Hansford and Spriggs 2006). Similarly, 
Westerland et al. (2010) show that increasing distance between the median member of the 
opinion coalition and the contemporary Supreme Court median significantly reduces compliance 
with precedents by circuit court panels. 
 
B. Additional Control Variables  
Of course, there are a number of other factors that are likely to affect the treatment of 
Supreme Court opinions by appeals courts, and we need to control for these in our analysis. We 
can usefully group these into characteristics of the cited Supreme Court opinion that may directly 
affect how a decision is received, and dynamic factors that capture changes in the legal 
environment (relative to the environment in which the original decision was issued) that may 
affect how a decision is treated. 
As previous work has shown, the most important characteristics of Supreme Court 
opinions that affect their subsequent treatment are the number of Justices who signed on to the 
opinion, the ideological range of the majority coalition, and the number of concurrences 
published alongside the opinion (Benjamin and Desmarais 2012, Westerland et al. 2010). The 
intuition for why these characteristics matter is immediate: One would expect that appeals courts 
are less likely to treat negatively and more likely to treat positively opinions that announce legal 
rules that are broadly acceptable and sensible to judges and lawyers across the ideological and 
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jurisprudential spectrum. The three characteristics indicate opinions for which this is likely to be 
the case: The greater the number of Justices who sign on to an opinion, and the broader the 
ideological range of that coalition (which we measure by the range of the majority in terms of 
Martin-Quinn scores), the more broadly acceptable the decision is likely to be. We thus expect 
these variables to reduce the number of strongly negative treatments, and to increase the number 
of Followed treatments during a given year. In contrast, a greater number of concurring opinions 
signals that there are alternative legal justifications for the outcome reached in a case, which 
signals that the opinion is less broadly acceptable. We thus expect the number of concurrences to 
increase the number of strongly negative treatments and to decrease the number of Followed 
treatments. Prior work provides evidence consistent with these expectations. For example, 
Benjamin and Desmarais (2012) show that aggregate strongly negative treatments of opinions 
increase with the number of published concurrences, and decrease for larger majority coalitions, 
and for broader coalitions. Similarly, Spriggs and Hansford (2001) find that the probability that 
an opinion will be overruled rises in the number of concurrences.
10
 
In addition to controlling for the ideological shift of the Supreme Court, we control for 
several factors that may affect the number of strongly negative or Followed treatments. One 
factor concerns the preferences of the courts of appeals relative to the Supreme Court that issued 
an opinion: One would expect that insofar as lower court judges are ideologically more distant 
from the Supreme Court that issued an opinion, they would be more inclined to negatively treat, 
and less inclined to follow, a precedent. Controlling for circuit court preferences poses a 
challenge: Our data represent a count of treatments of Supreme Court opinions across the courts 
of appeals in a given year.  Therefore, we focus on the aggregate preferences of the courts of 
appeals relative to the Supreme Court. Specifically, for each Supreme Court opinion-year, we 
include the absolute difference between the number of Democratic appointees on the Supreme 
Court that issued an opinion and the number of Democratic appointees of the courts of appeals in 
that year, a standard approach (see McGuire et al. 2009). We expect that as this difference 
increases, the number of strongly negative treatments will increase, and the number of Followed 
treatments will decline. 
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 In contrast, in their random sample of 500 Supreme Court opinions, Westerland et al. (2010) find that the number 
of concurrences has a small positive impact on the probability of compliance. However, they do not discuss this 
finding. 
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Strongly negative treatments are more likely, and Followed treatments less likely, after 
the Supreme Court itself has treated an opinion negatively, thus sending a signal to appeals 
courts that an opinion is open to criticism (Westerland et al. 2010). This effect should get 
stronger the more often the Supreme Court has treated an opinion negatively. We thus include a 
count of the number of times an opinion has been treated negatively by the Supreme Court. 
Similarly, if an opinion is explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court, we would of course expect 
appeals courts to treat this opinion more negatively and less positively (Benesh and Reddick 
2002). We control for this possibility by including a binary variable that indicates opinion-years 
after an opinion has been overruled. Because opinions may become less relevant over time, we 
include the age of the opinion. Finally, we must take account of the fact that opinions do not have 
equal opportunities to be treated negatively or positively. Opinions vary in the extent to which 
they are pertinent to the issues currently before the courts of appeals. Some decisions are relevant 
in many cases, and thus are cited frequently. Others are more obscure and cited infrequently. 
Naturally, an opinion that is relevant in many cases, and is cited often, has a higher likelihood of 
being treated negatively or positively than an opinion that is hardly ever relevant, and therefore 
has few opportunities to be treated negatively or positively. To capture this, we include the 
(logged) count of the number of times an opinion is Followed in a given year in the federal 
district courts.
11
 
 
IV. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS  
 Because our dependent variable is a count of the number of times a given Supreme Court 
opinion is treated in a strongly negative or positive fashion by the courts of appeals in a given 
year, we employ count models to test our hypothesis. Typically, the primary quantity of interest 
in a count model is the incidence rate over an observation period. This incidence rate has a 
systematic component, usually modeled as an exponential function of a set of covariates, as well 
as a stochastic component. The stochastic component is often assumed to follow a Poisson 
distribution, which implies that events (in our case, treatments of Supreme Court opinions) are 
conditionally independent. This is a strong assumption that is likely violated in our data: Once an 
opinion has been criticized by a lower court, for example, it may be easier for the same court (or 
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 To be precise, we use ln(# of contemporary Follows+1) in order to deal with the fact that some opinions are not 
treated at all during some years.  
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another court of appeals) to do so again. The result of such positive contagion is overdispersion 
in the data, which results in a downward bias in standard errors (King 1989). To deal with this 
problem, researchers typically assume that the stochastic component of the incidence rate 
follows a negative binomial distribution, a solution we adopt as well.
12
 
In so doing, we must confront two additional challenges. One relates directly to the issue 
of overdispersion. Our data has a panel structure: We observe the treatment of separate Supreme 
Court opinions over time, and it is likely that overdispersion does not affect each opinion in the 
same way. This is a common challenge in panel datasets. The standard way to address such unit 
heterogeneity is to estimate a random-effects negative binomial model that allows the dispersion 
parameter to vary randomly across units (Hilbe 2011). In our specific case, this means that the 
dispersion parameter is assumed to be constant for each opinion, but can vary randomly across 
opinions.
13
 
The second challenge concerns the large number of observations (opinion-years) for 
which no treatment is recorded, especially in our analysis of strongly negative treatments. The 
presence of a large number of zeros in the dependent variable suggests that separate processes 
may drive whether an opinion is ever treated, and how often it is treated once it attracts the 
attention of the lower courts. Statistically, in such situations, the use of zero-inflated negative 
binomial models may be appropriate (King 1989: 222f., Zorn 1998). Such models estimate two 
separate equations – one to predict the presence of no incidents, and one to model the count, 
where the count is positive. However, these models involve a difficult tradeoff: zero-inflated 
negative binomial models are not able to take account of the heterogeneity in the dispersion 
parameter that is addressed through a random effects negative binomial model. We confront this 
challenge by estimating both types of models. The results are broadly comparable. Because the 
random-effects model accounts for panel effects across opinions, we opt to present this model in 
the main text. Results from the zero-inflated model are provided in the appendix. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 One indication of overdispersion in the dependent variable is a standard deviation that is larger than the mean of 
the dependent variable; in our data, this is the case for both strongly negative treatments and Followed 
treatments.  Supplemental results from a Poisson model, which yields similar results, are included in the 
replication file available at http:[REMOVED].  
13
 All models are estimated using STATA 13, which implements this kind of model through the xtnbreg command. 
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A. Results: Negative Treatments 
We begin our analysis by investigating how often an opinion will be explicitly criticized, 
questioned, or limited in a courts of appeals decision during a given year, i.e., the number of 
times an opinion receives a treatment classified as strongly negative by Shepard’s. In Table 3, we 
report results from a random effects negative binomial model (with bootstrapped standard 
errors), predicting the count of strongly negative treatments of a given Supreme Court opinion 
during a given year in courts of appeals decisions. Before focusing on the effects of the key 
explanatory variables, note that the control variables are largely in line with the existing 
literature. Once a case has been overruled, it attracts a larger number of strongly negative 
treatments in the courts of appeals. Strongly negative treatments occur more rarely for opinions 
signed by larger majorities, while opinions accompanied by concurrences attract a larger number 
of strongly negative treatments. Opinions that are relevant for a greater number of cases, as 
indicated by the fact that they are followed more often in the district courts, attract more strongly 
negative treatments – a result that we interpret as evidence of the fact that opinions that come up 
in many cases are at greater risk of being criticized simply because there are more opportunities 
to do so. As opinions age, they attract fewer strongly negative treatments. Interestingly, we find 
no statistically significant effect of the range of the coalition that supported the opinion, the 
ideological shift between the enacting and current Supreme Court, or the enacting Supreme 
Court and the overall ideological leaning of the courts of appeals. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Turning to our main variable of interest – the number of Justices in the original majority 
coalition who remain on the Court – we find strong evidence consistent with our hypothesis. The 
estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant, indicating that opinions receive 
more strongly negative treatments as more Justices from the original majority retire. Importantly, 
this effect is evident while controlling for general ideological change and the age of the opinion. 
This provides strong support for our hypothesis. 
Because estimated coefficients of count models are difficult to interpret directly, we 
illustrate the substantive impact and the uncertainty surrounding our estimates graphically. 
Figure 1 plots the predicted number of strongly negative treatments per year conditional on the 
number of Justices who remain on the Court from the original majority coalition, along with 95% 
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confidence intervals. The top panel shows this predicted number for unanimous opinions, the 
second panel for 7-2 decisions, and the final panel for 5-4 decisions. The results are strikingly 
consistent with the hypothesis. The predicted number of strongly negative treatments of a 
Supreme Court opinion in the courts of appeals rises as the Justices who constituted the original 
majority coalition retire. Moreover, the substantive size of the effect is significant: For 
unanimous opinions, there is a roughly nine-fold increase in the expected number of strongly 
negative treatments as the Justices who joined the decision retire until none are left on the Court. 
For 7-2 decisions, the increase is roughly four-fold, while it is close to three-fold for 5-4 
decisions. The absolute number of predicted strongly negative treatments is small. But, as we 
noted above, strongly negative treatments represent a highly risky strategy for circuit court 
judges, and that these are predicted counts of strongly negative treatments for a specific decision 
in a specific year. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
B. Results: Positive Treatments (Followed) 
 Explicit negative treatments represent an extreme form of trying to limit the impact of a 
relevant precedent and may, in this sense, be much like the tip of the proverbial iceberg. Rather 
than engaging in overt resistance, circuit court judges who wish to avoid the implications of a 
relevant precedent are more likely to engage in a less confrontational style of noncompliance: 
They can simply refrain from following a precedent. And just as they may feel more comfortable 
openly criticizing an opinion as the Justices who supported it retire from the Supreme Court, so 
circuit court judges may feel less pressure to explicitly follow an opinion as the Justices who 
supported the decision retire. We now turn to an analysis of this phenomenon. 
 In Table 4, we present the results of a random-effects, negative binomial model of the 
number of explicit Followed treatments of a Supreme Court opinion in a given year with 
bootstrapped standard errors. As in the previous analysis, the random effects estimation assumes 
that the dispersion parameter is constant for any opinion, but can vary randomly across opinions. 
Before turning to the key variable of interest, note that the control variables largely continue to 
have the expected impact – in fact, the results are even stronger than for the negative treatments. 
Most importantly, increasing ideological distance between the enacting Supreme Court and the 
contemporary Supreme Court results in a smaller number of Followed treatments – that is, circuit 
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judges are less likely to explicitly follow a precedent if the Court that enacted the precedent is 
ideologically distant from the current Supreme Court. Similarly, as the courts of appeals as a 
whole are ideologically more distant from the enacting Supreme Court, fewer Followed 
treatments are predicted. Similarly, opinions that have been explicitly overruled by the Supreme 
Court generate a smaller number of Follows. Interestingly, opinions supported by broader 
coalitions – both in terms of the number of majority votes, as well as the ideological range of the 
opinion coalition – result in fewer Followed treatments, a finding that stands in contrast to the 
results for strongly negative treatments. 
 Of course, the main variable of interest is the number of Justices remaining of the original 
majority coalition. Once again, the results clearly support our expectations. As the Justices who 
originally joined a decision leave the Court, the number of Followed treatments begins to drop, 
and this impact is statistically highly significant. As before, we turn to a graphic illustration to 
demonstrate the substantive impact of this effect. In Figure 2, we plot the predicted number of 
Followed treatments for an opinion in a given year, conditional on the number of Justices 
remaining of the original majority (along with 95% confidence intervals). Once again, the top 
panel illustrates the impact for unanimous decisions, the middle panel for 7-2 decisions, and the 
bottom panel for 5-4 decisions. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
The message of Figure 2 is striking: As the Justices in the original majority coalition 
retire, there is a statistically highly significant and substantively massive decrease in the 
propensity of circuit courts to explicitly follow the opinion – the predicted number of Followed 
treatments per year falls by roughly 70% (unanimous decisions) to 100% (5-4 decisions). Put 
simply, as those Justices who explicitly supported a Supreme Court decision retire, circuit court 
judges are significantly less likely to feel the need to explicitly follow the precedent in cases 
before them. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 The U.S. Supreme Court has a tremendous impact on social, economic, and political 
outcomes in the US despite the fact that the Court itself revolves only a small number of disputes 
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each term. Instead, much of the Court’s influence is indirect. The opinions issued by the Court 
steer the decisions of lower courts – and it is in these lower courts that the vast bulk of legal 
disputes are resolved. The prominent role of lower courts in giving life to the jurisprudential 
doctrines announced by the Supreme Court raises a critical question: Given that lower court 
judges must typically choose among a host of potentially relevant precedents, some of which 
may conflict with one another, what makes a particular Supreme Court opinion more or less 
influential in the lower courts? Scholars have long recognized the importance of this question, 
and a well-established literature has explored factors that lead lower court judges to treat 
opinions more or less favorably. We now know that the size and breadth of majority coalitions, 
the number of concurrences, and the extent of ideological change on the Supreme Court all 
contribute to how opinions are received in the lower courts (Benesh and Reddick 2002; 
Benjamin and Desmarais 2012; Black and Spriggs 2008; Corley 2009, Westerland et al. 2010, 
Hansford and Spriggs 2006). 
 In this paper, we have examined a factor that has so far escaped sustained examination: 
The impact of the departure of Justices who supported a Supreme Court opinion. We have argued 
that despite the Supreme Court’s insistence that lower courts should not engage in 
prognostication in anticipating the views of the Supreme Court on relevant precedents, judges in 
the lower courts face strong incentives to interpret the past decisions in ways that the current 
Supreme Court will accept. Doing so minimizes the risk of suffering the embarrassment of being 
reversed or reprimanded, and allows the lower court’s decision to go into effect. The retirement 
of Supreme Court Justices is critical in this context, because the departure of Justices who signed 
on to an opinion, and their replacement by new Justices can signal to lower court judges that 
support for the opinion on the current Supreme Court may have weakened. Moreover, such 
retirements are a particularly simple and easily observed heuristic. As a result, we expect that the 
influence of Supreme Court opinions is subject to a retirement effect: Controlling for the degree 
of ideological change on the Supreme Court, lower court judges are more likely to criticize 
Supreme Court opinions and less likely to follow them as the Justices who joined the decision 
retire. The smaller the number of Justices who remain from the original majority coalition, the 
stronger this effect will become. Our empirical results, which are based on tracking the annual 
treatment of all Supreme Court majority opinions in the courts of appeals between 1953 and 
2012, provide clear and substantively significant support for this argument: As the Justices who 
signed on to an opinion retire from the Court, the propensity of lower court judges to follow the 
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opinion drops significantly, and the willingness of lower court judges to explicitly criticize the 
opinion increases. 
These findings have important implications for our understanding of Supreme Court 
precedents and the effects of personnel turnover on the Supreme Court. The Court sees itself as a 
continuing body, and of course it is.  But for purposes of its precedents, each new Court (that is, 
after each departure and replacement) is a new entity, and lower court judges are likely to react to 
the fact that Justices who joined a decision are no longer present. This implies that the 
significance of the replacement of one Justice by another extends beyond the impact on future 
decisions by the Supreme Court itself. Such a change also affects how existing case law is 
applied in the judicial hierarchy. If a Justice wants a precedent to retain force in the lower courts, 
she should remain on the Court, and encourage other members of the majority to remain as well. 
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Table 1: Number of Strongly Negative and Positive Treatments of 
Supreme Court Majority Opinions in the Courts of Appeals, 1953-
2012 
 
# of 
Treatments 
Strongly 
Negative 
Treatments 
Positive 
Treatments 
None 
4,795 
(83%) 
682 
(12%) 
1-3 
894 
(15%) 
1,367 
(23%) 
4-7 
71 
(1%) 
1,063 
(17%) 
8 or more 
53 
(1%) 
2,701 
(48%) 
Number of 
Opinions 
5,813 5,813 
  
 
Table 2: Number of Strongly Negative and Positive Treatments of 
Supreme Court Majority Opinions in the Courts of Appeals on an 
Annual Basis, 1953-2012 
 
# of 
Treatments 
per year 
Strongly 
Negative 
Treatments 
Positive 
Treatments 
None 
186,467 
(99%) 
145,240 
(77%) 
1 
1,634 
(0.9%) 
23,321 
(12.5%) 
2-3 
244 
(0.1%) 
12,233 
(6.5%) 
4 or more 
79 
(0%) 
7,630 
(4%) 
Number of 
Opinion-
Years 
188,424 188,424 
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Table 3: Strongly Negative Treatments of Supreme Court Majority 
Opinions in the Courts of Appeals, 1953-2012 
  
# of majority Justices remaining -0.208 
(0.028) 
*** 
Shift in SC medians 
 
0.014 
(0.079) 
 
Shift between SC and CoA -0.007 
(0.005) 
 
# of majority votes 
 
-0.071 
(0.029) 
** 
Range of majority 
 
-0.003 
(0.020) 
 
# of concurrences 
 
0.114 
(0.045) 
** 
Strongly negative treatments by SC -0.083 
(0.089) 
 
Case overruled 
 
3.092 
(0.036) 
*** 
# of contemporary follows in District 
Courts (log) 
 
0.307 
(0.036) 
*** 
Opinion age -0.065 
(0.006) 
*** 
Constant 0.207 
(0.230) 
 
/ln(r) 1.949 
(0.099) 
 
/ln(s) -1.082 
(0.079) 
 
N of opinion-years 188,424  
N of opinions 5,813  
BIC 20,620  
AIC 20,488  
 
NOTE: Dependent variable is # of strongly negative treatments in a Court of Appeals decision 
in a given year. Random effects, negative binomial regression with bootstrapped standard 
errors. *** significant at 0<0.01,** significant at p<0.05, * significant at p<0.10. 
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Table 4: Positive Treatments of Supreme Court Majority Opinions 
in the Courts of Appeals, 1953-2012 
  
# of majority Justices remaining 0.070 
(0.008) 
*** 
Shift in SC medians 
 
-0.185 
(0.020) 
*** 
Shift between SC and CoA -0.005 
(0.001) 
*** 
# of majority votes 
 
-0.032 
(0.018) 
* 
Range of majority 
 
-0.035 
(0.015) 
** 
# of concurrences 
 
0.141 
(0.026) 
*** 
Strongly negative treatments by SC 0.036 
(0.040) 
 
Case overruled 
 
-0.543 
(0.089) 
*** 
# of contemporary follows in District 
Courts (log) 
 
0.499 
(0.013) 
*** 
Opinion age -0.013 
(0.002) 
*** 
Constant 0.459 
(0.121) 
 
/ln(r) 1.239 
(0.044) 
 
/ln(s) -0.085 
(0.027) 
 
N of opinion-years 188,424  
N of opinions 5,813  
BIC 260,472  
AIC 260,340  
 
NOTE: Dependent variable is # of “follow” treatments in a Court of Appeals decision in a given 
year. Random effects, negative binomial regression with bootstrapped standard errors. *** 
significant at 0<0.01,** significant at p<0.05, * significant at p<0.10. 
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Figure 1: Predicted number of strongly negative treatments/year 
conditional on number of Justices remaining from the original 
majority 
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Figure 2: Predicted number of Followed treatments/year 
conditional on number of Justices remaining from the original 
majority 
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Appendix – Robustness Checks 
 
This appendix provides estimates from zero-inflated negative binomial models (with standard 
errors clustered on Supreme Court opinion) as a robustness check on the random effects models 
reported in the body of the paper. The zero-inflated models do not account for heterogeneity in 
the dispersion parameter. However, they provide a separate logit model (the “inflation model”) to 
predict whether an observation has no observations, followed by a count model that estimates a 
negative binomial model for the positive counts. The inflation model is a logit model predicting 
the probability of observing a zero count. Note the key result: The number of Justices has the 
expected, statistically significant impact in the count model of both estimations. The more 
Justices remain, the fewer the number of strong negative treatments, and the greater the number 
of Followed treatments. 
 
Table A1: Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Model of Strongly Negative Treatments 
 Inflation Model Count model 
# of majority Justices remaining -0.093 
(0.068) 
 -0.255 
(0.066) 
*** 
Shift in SC medians 
 
0.193 
(0.193) 
 0.166 
(0.177) 
 
Shift between SC and CoA 0.039 
(0.014) 
*** 0.025 
(0.014) 
* 
# of majority votes 
 
0.245 
(0.083) 
*** 0.137 
(0.071) 
* 
Range of majority 
 
0.012 
(0.049) 
 0.010 
(0.043) 
 
# of concurrences 
 
-0.318 
(0.100) 
*** -0.192 
(0.084) 
** 
Strongly negative treatments by SC -1.356 
(0.287) 
*** 0.322 
(0.055) 
*** 
Case overruled 
 
-15.621 
(7.663) 
** 2.102 
(0.232) 
*** 
# of contemporary follows in District Courts 
(log) 
 
-0.106 
(0.110) 
 
0.364 
(0.099) 
*** 
Opinion age -0.048 
(0.014) 
*** -0.097 
(0.010) 
*** 
Constant 0.421 
(0.598) 
 -2.210 
(.0535) 
*** 
alpha 3.102 
(0.417) 
N of opinion-years 188,424 
1,957 
186,467 
21,783 
21,550 
N of non-zero observations 
N of zero observations 
BIC 
AIC 
 
NOTE: Dependent variable is # of strongly negative treatments in a court of appeals decision in 
a given year. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression with standard errors clustered on the 
opinion. *** significant at 0<0.01,** significant at p<0.05, * significant at p<0.10. 
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Table A2: Zero-inflated Negative Binomial Model of Follow Treatments 
 Inflation Model Count model 
# of majority Justices remaining 0.131 
(0.035) 
*** 0.086 
(0.025) 
*** 
Shift in SC medians 
 
-0.130 
(0.133) 
 -0.241 
(0.068) 
*** 
Shift between SC and CoA -0.015 
(0.008) 
* -0.002 
(0.005) 
 
# of majority votes 
 
-0.016 
(0.058) 
 -0.060 
(0.035) 
* 
Range of majority 
 
-0.000 
(0.031) 
 -0.014 
(0.018) 
 
# of concurrences 
 
-0.232 
(0.077) 
*** 0.058 
(0.036) 
 
Strongly negative treatments by SC 0.636 
(0.206) 
*** 1.014 
(0.453) 
** 
Case overruled 
 
-0.118 
(0.347) 
 -0.397 
(0.223) 
* 
# of contemporary follows in District Courts 
(log) 
 
-2.758 
(0.198) 
*** 0.847 
(0.036) 
*** 
Opinion age 0.048 
(0.011) 
*** -0.016 
(0.007) 
** 
Constant -0.542 
(0.255) 
** -0.348 
(.164) 
** 
alpha 0.402 
(0.097) 
N of opinion-years 188,424 
43,184 
145,240 
294,082 
293,849 
N of non-zero observations 
N of zero observations 
BIC 
AIC 
 
NOTE: Dependent variable is # of Follow treatments in a court of appeals decision in a given 
year. Zero-inflated negative binomial regression with standard errors clustered on the opinion. 
*** significant at 0<0.01,** significant at p<0.05, * significant at p<0.10. 
 
 
 
